By Harsh Singh Dahiya, Advocate, Supreme Court of India | Partner, Sterling & Partners

In the early hours of 15 March 2025, firefighters responding to a fire at 30 Tughlak Crescent, New Delhi — the official residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, then a judge of the Delhi High Court — discovered what witnesses described as sacks and piles of burnt and half-burnt currency notes, predominantly in denominations of Rs 500, in a storeroom on the premises. Photographs and video footage taken by fire and police personnel at the scene circulated widely. The incident triggered an institutional response unprecedented in the recent history of the Indian judiciary: the Chief Justice of India constituted an in-house inquiry committee within days; the CJI subsequently recommended impeachment proceedings to the President; the Lok Sabha Speaker admitted a motion signed by over 100 Members of Parliament; and a Lok Sabha inquiry committee was constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. On 16 January 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed Justice Varma’s own petition challenging the inquiry committee’s constitution.

The case has brought India’s judicial accountability framework — a subject often discussed in the abstract — into sharp and uncomfortable focus. This post examines the facts as established by inquiry proceedings, the existing mechanisms for holding judges accountable, the structural gaps those mechanisms reveal, and the reforms that the Yashwant Varma episode is likely to compel.

What the In-House Inquiry Found

The Fire, the Discovery, and the Committee’s Findings

The fire at Justice Varma’s residence was reported at approximately 11:35 pm on 14 March 2025. Fire service personnel and police officers who attended the scene later testified to the presence of large quantities of burnt currency in a storeroom of the outhouse. The then Chief Justice of India, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, constituted a three-judge in-house inquiry committee within days of the incident.

The committee interviewed 55 witnesses over ten days, reviewed CCTV footage, photographs, and videos from the scene, and visited the residence. Its report concluded that “strong evidence” existed that Justice Varma and his family had “tacit or active control” of the storeroom where the currency was found. The report also recorded “strong inferential evidence” that the burnt currency was removed from the premises in the early hours of 15 March 2025 — after fire personnel had left the scene — with the Private Secretary of Justice Varma identified among those involved.

Justice Varma denied knowledge of the cash, stated he was not in Delhi on the date of the incident, and alleged a conspiracy. The committee noted that his explanations were contradictory, that he had not inspected the site on returning, had not secured CCTV footage, and had not filed any complaint about the alleged conspiracy. The committee concluded: “The misconduct found proved is serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of Justice Yashwant Varma.”

Following the committee’s findings, CJI Khanna requested Justice Varma’s resignation. Justice Varma refused. He was transferred from the Delhi High Court to the Allahabad High Court and relieved of judicial duties. The CJI transmitted the committee’s report to the President and Prime Minister of India with a recommendation for impeachment proceedings. Impeachment proceedings were thereafter set in motion.

India’s Judicial Accountability Framework: The Architecture

India’s framework for judicial accountability consists of two distinct mechanisms: the in-house procedure developed by the judiciary itself, and the constitutional impeachment process.

The In-House Procedure

The in-house procedure for inquiring into the conduct of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts was developed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s direction in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995). It is an internal, non-statutory mechanism. A complaint against a High Court judge is received by the Chief Justice of that High Court or directly by the Chief Justice of India. If the complaint is found to be of a serious nature, the CJI may constitute a three-member committee — comprising two Chief Justices of other High Courts and one High Court judge — to conduct a fact-finding inquiry.

The committee’s inquiry is non-adversarial: it is a fact-finding exercise, not a criminal trial. The judge concerned is entitled to appear and respond. On the basis of the committee’s findings, the CJI may advise the judge to resign or seek voluntary retirement. If the judge refuses, the CJI may direct that no judicial work be allocated to the judge and may inform the President and Prime Minister accordingly. The committee’s report may also be transmitted with a recommendation for the initiation of impeachment proceedings.

The in-house procedure has been criticised extensively for its structural limitations. It lacks statutory backing. Its recommendations are not legally binding — a judge who refuses to resign cannot be compelled to do so by the committee or the CJI acting alone. There is no fixed timeline for the process, which can extend over months. It is conducted entirely within the judiciary, with no independent external oversight. In the Yashwant Varma case, the CJI’s recommendation of impeachment and the President’s receipt of the report represented the outer limit of what the in-house procedure could accomplish unilaterally.

Impeachment Under Articles 124 and 218

The constitutional provision for removing a judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court is found in Articles 124(4) and 218 of the Constitution, read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

A motion for the removal of a judge must be signed by at least 100 members of the Lok Sabha or 50 members of the Rajya Sabha. Upon admission of the motion by the Speaker or Chairman, a three-member inquiry committee is constituted, comprising a judge of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist. If the committee finds the judge guilty of “proved misbehaviour” or “incapacity,” the report is submitted to the presiding officer. A motion for removal must then be passed by both Houses of Parliament by a special majority — a majority of the total membership of each House, and not less than two-thirds of members present and voting. The President then issues the removal order.

No judge of the Supreme Court or any High Court has ever been removed through the impeachment process. Justice V. Ramaswami, a sitting Supreme Court judge, survived impeachment proceedings in 1993 when the motion failed in the Lok Sabha due to insufficient votes. Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court resigned in 2011 after the Rajya Sabha passed a motion against him, before the Lok Sabha could vote. In Justice Varma’s case, the Rajya Sabha’s motion was rejected on procedural grounds — the Deputy Chairman, then discharging the Chairman’s functions after Jagdeep Dhankhar’s resignation, found the motion deficient. The Speaker of the Lok Sabha admitted a separately filed Lok Sabha motion and constituted an inquiry committee. The Supreme Court, in its January 2026 judgment, upheld the Speaker’s action and dismissed Justice Varma’s challenge.

Gaps in the Framework and the Case for Reform

The Yashwant Varma episode has exposed several structural weaknesses in India’s judicial accountability architecture that have been discussed by legal scholars for years but never legislatively addressed.

First, the in-house procedure is entirely extra-statutory. It has no legislative backing, no time limits, and no enforceable outcomes. A judge can refuse to resign and can continue in office — without judicial work — for months or years while proceedings inch forward.

Second, there is a “resignation loophole” — a sitting judge facing impeachment proceedings can resign at any time, divesting Parliament of jurisdiction. This exposes a gap between the purpose of accountability (deterring and punishing judicial misconduct) and the outcome (a resigned judge facing no further consequence other than loss of the judicial position).

Third, the impeachment process requires extraordinary political consensus. A two-thirds majority in both Houses is a threshold that has never been achieved in any impeachment attempt in India’s history. Given the current political dynamics, even a judge found guilty of serious misconduct by a statutory inquiry committee cannot be removed if the ruling coalition lacks sufficient parliamentary support. The result is that impeachment is simultaneously the only legally binding mechanism of removal and the least practically achievable.

Fourth, India has no independent external mechanism — analogous to a judicial conduct commission — with the power to investigate complaints, impose disciplinary sanctions short of removal, or publish findings. The judiciary’s self-regulation framework relies entirely on the moral authority of the CJI, which varies with the individual and is structurally vulnerable to institutional solidarity.

Several reform proposals have gained renewed currency in the wake of the Yashwant Varma episode. These include the establishment of a statutory judicial accountability commission with independent membership; mandatory annual asset disclosure by judges of the higher judiciary; fixed timelines for in-house inquiry proceedings; and legislative specifications clarifying the consequences of the in-house procedure’s recommendations.

Key Takeaways

  • On 14–15 March 2025, large quantities of burnt and unaccounted cash were discovered at the official residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, then a judge of the Delhi High Court. An in-house inquiry committee found “strong evidence” of his involvement.
  • The Chief Justice of India’s recommendation for impeachment, followed by a Lok Sabha inquiry committee constituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, represents the most advanced stage that impeachment proceedings against any sitting Indian judge have reached in recent decades.
  • India has two mechanisms for judicial accountability: the non-statutory in-house procedure and the constitutional impeachment process under Articles 124(4) and 218. Neither has ever resulted in the actual removal of a sitting judge.
  • The in-house procedure lacks statutory force. Its recommendations — including the advice to resign — cannot be compelled. A judge who refuses to resign faces only administrative consequences (no allocation of judicial work) pending impeachment.
  • Impeachment requires a special majority in both Houses of Parliament and the President’s order. No Indian judge has ever been removed through this process.
  • The Yashwant Varma case has renewed demands for structural judicial accountability reform, including independent oversight mechanisms, mandatory asset disclosure, and statutory timelines for misconduct proceedings.

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